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Current Perspectives on Cognitive
Diversity
Andrea Bender* and Sieghard Beller
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To what extent is cognition influenced by a person’s cultural background? This question
has remained controversial in large fields of the cognitive sciences, including cognitive
psychology, and is also underexplored in anthropology. In this perspective article,
findings from a recent wave of cross-cultural studies will be outlined with respect to
three aspects of cognition: perception and categorization, number representation and
counting, and explanatory frameworks and beliefs. Identifying similarities and differences
between these domains allows for general conclusions regarding cognitive diversity
and helps to highlight the importance of culturally shaped content for a comprehensive
understanding of cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of the extent to which, if at all, cognition may be influenced by a person’s cultural
background has remained controversial in large fields of the cognitive sciences, including cognitive
psychology, and chapters on this issue remain absent from cognitive psychology textbooks. In fact,
the majority of cognitive scientists do not even consider it a relevant question to begin with. This
is largely due to some of the core assumptions on which cognitive science was originally built
(e.g., Flanagan, 1991), according to which cognition itself is taken as universal, conceptualized
as information processing based on knowledge representations. Only its content, such as people’s
beliefs, has been widely conceived of as susceptible to cultural influences, and though initially
regarded as a core issue for cognitive science (Norman, 1980), beliefs have been disregarded in
the field at large (Bender et al., 2010; Bender and Beller, 2011b).
Interestingly, a similar reluctance to engage in cross-cultural research can be observed
among many of those inherently interested in culture, that is, cultural anthropologists, but for
entirely different reasons (Bloch, 2012). Besides epistemological disagreements and a somewhat
underdeveloped interest in cognition, one of their main reasons for not looking into the possible
cultural influences on cognition may have been the concern with what the outcome of cultural
comparisons would imply. This concern, which weighs particularly heavily in light of the colonial,
imperialistic, and racist periods not only in Euro-American history but also in Euro-American
science, has prevented most anthropologists from regarding cross-cultural comparisons as a
passable route. While this attitude is understandable, its consequences are detrimental, as the other
cognitive sciences were left believing that their universalistic assumptions are valid. Disregarding
the potential and actual diversity in cognition not only fails to do justice to those who are of concern
to anthropologists, but also renders an inaccurate account of how the vast majority of humankind
perceives, memorizes, or reasons.
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Voices have been raised in criticism of this neglect (e.g.,
Arnett, 2008; Beller et al., 2012), and specifically the article on the
“weirdest people” (Henrich et al., 2010) generated an upsurge of
interest in cross-cultural studies1. Here, we intend to take stock of
what has been achieved since then in three exemplary domains, in
order to derive general conclusions on what we will be forfeiting if
we do not take the cultural diversity of cognition more seriously.
COGNITIVE DIVERSITY IN THREE
DOMAINS
Partly in line with the emphasis in current research, this overview
focuses on three exemplary aspects of cognition: perception
and categorization, number representation and counting, and
explanatory frameworks and beliefs.
Perception and Categorization
Perception is the most basic process of gaining information, be
it visual information about shape or color, acoustic information
about words and other sounds, or olfactory information about
smells. Our sensory apparatus receives signals, preprocesses
them, and forwards them until, given sufficient attention, they
become subject to further processing. Even if perception itself is
often conceived of as distinct from cognition proper, its output
is co-constructed in a joint bottom–up/top–down manner with
the aid of higher-order cognitive processing, including those
processes related to action (Witt, 2011), and hence may be
affected by cultural factors (e.g., Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005).
A particularly impressive example of both the non-objective
nature of perception and its susceptibility to culture is the Müller-
Lyer illusion. This illusion, in which two equally long lines appear
to be of different lengths depending on the visual context, is
robust and persists even after explicit instruction. And yet, of
the 16 groups investigated in a cross-cultural study, US-American
participants most strongly overestimated the difference between
the lines, while this discrepancy was almost absent among hunter-
gatherers in southern Africa (Segall et al., 1963, 1966; for other
examples see also Ahluwalia, 1978; Sekiyama, 1997). Notably, this
case of cultural differences in an ostensibly hard-wired illusion—
although already reported in a high impact journal in the 1960s—
only reached prominence after being showcased by Henrich et al.
(2010). According to the most frequently cited explanation, the
occurrence and extent of this illusion depends on the prevalence
of rectangular shapes in people’s environment, and hence on the
input to which the perceptual system is continuously trained and
calibrated.
1Please note that the above picture characterizes the tendencies in mainstream
cognitive psychology and cultural anthropology. Exceptions to these comprise
cognitive anthropologists (e.g., D’Andrade, 1995; Kronenfeld et al., 2011) and
ethno-linguists (e.g., Lucy, 1992a,b; Gumperz and Levinson, 1996) engaging in
cross-cultural studies, cultural psychologists in the tradition of Luria (1976) and
Vygotsky (1978) as well as Bruner (e.g., Bruner et al., 1966) and Cole (Cole et al.,
1971; Cole and Scribner, 1974) and the school in social psychology evolved around
the idea that thinking styles are shaped by the social orientation embedded in broad
cultural traditions (reviewed in Nisbett et al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2010; Grossmann
and Na, 2014).
A more explicit effect of culture is discussed for color
discrimination. Here, the question focuses on whether perception
is affected not by environmental stimuli themselves, but
by the color lexicon—that is, by a cognitively accessible,
classificatory system; in this sense, perception is closely
related to categorization (for excellent reviews on culture
and categorization especially in the biological domain, see
Berlin, 1992; Medin and Atran, 1999, 2004; Atran and Medin,
2008; Ojalehto and Medin, 2015). Although findings are
more controversial for color categorization than for biological
categorization (Regier et al., 2005; Roberson et al., 2005),
they seem to confirm that, once language comes into play,
color perception is indeed tinged (Regier and Kay, 2009).
Similar findings are reported also for other domains (Malt
and Majid, 2013; Majid and Van Staden, 2015) and even
for sense modalities like olfaction, which have long been
neglected by Western science as underdeveloped and coarse-
grained (partly due to the coarse-grained taxonomy on smells in
Western languages such as English). Recent studies on olfaction
among hunter-gatherer groups in Southeast Asia, in contrast,
furnished evidence for the capability of human languages to
encode smell qualities in a much more fine-grained, coherently
structured manner (Majid and Burenhult, 2014; Wnuk and
Majid, 2014).
Language and cultural metaphors may also affect the
perception and reproduction of other abstract experiences such
as those pertaining to time (overviews in Núñez and Cooperrider,
2013; Bender and Beller, 2014b; Sinha and Gärdenfors, 2014)
or musical pitch. A series of experiments on the latter revealed
that speakers of languages in which pitch is habitually described
in terms of height (such as English or Dutch) are affected
by height-related stimuli when reproducing pitch, whereas
speakers of languages in which pitch is described in terms
of thickness (such as Farsi) are affected by thickness-related
stimuli—even in entirely non-linguistic, psychophysical tasks
(Dolscheid et al., 2013). While shaped by linguistic habits, these
space-pitch associations also build on pre-existing associations
already found in pre-linguistic infants (Dolscheid et al.,
2014).
A cognitive process closely linked to perception is attention,
by which awareness is directed to some segments in the stream of
incoming signals. It has been known for some time that attention
itself may also be susceptible to cultural influences, with North
Americans tending to be less attentive to contextual information
than East Asians (Nisbett and Masuda, 2003; Masuda and Nisbett,
2006), and especially so when asked to construct narratives of
their observation (Senzaki et al., 2014). Attention can also, in
line with cultural predispositions, be more or less explicitly
directed to the quasi-perceptual experiences in hallucinations
(Luhrmann et al., 2015) or dreams (Glaskin, 2011, 2015), guiding
their interpretation and even the way in which people deal with
them.
Attention is not only essential for what we become aware of,
but partly also for how we integrate this new information—or
how we express it through, for instance, artistic visualization.
This was indicated in a study with three cultural groups in
northern Siberia (Istomin et al., 2014); in each of the groups,
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both perceptual tests and artistic styles were based on the same
perceptual tendencies, but these tendencies differed between
groups, in line with differences in patterns of social and
environmental interaction.
Number Representation and Counting
A broad range of cognitive processes contributes to what
can be called numerical cognition (Gaber and Schlimm,
2015), which is assumed to be based on three systems:
two core systems for parallel individuation and approximate
magnitude, which are available in human infants and non-
human species, and a uniquely human, symbolic system
implemented as counting sequence (Feigenson et al., 2004).
The paramount importance of the symbolic system for human
numerical cognition has been demonstrated among groups
in Amazonia that use no or only imprecise number words
(Gordon, 2004; Pica et al., 2004), Nicaraguan home-signers
(Spaepen et al., 2011), and even US-American students when
prevented from accessing the counting sequence (Frank et al.,
2012).
If we disregard the availability of a symbolic system, it would
appear at first glance that numerical cognition does not seem to
allow for much variance. After all, numbers map onto objective
and discrete quantities that are identical the world over, and
the same seems to hold for basic arithmetic, if not advanced
algebraic operations. And yet, even the manner in which the
non-symbolic intuition on approximate magnitude is cognitively
represented—namely with the characteristics of a mental number
line (Dehaene, 2003; Dehaene et al., 2008)—is subject to cultural
variability (Bender and Beller, 2011a). Factors contributing to
this variability include, for instance, writing direction and finger
counting habits, resulting in the reversal of the originally left-
to-right orientation (Dehaene et al., 1993; Fischer and Brugger,
2011; Shaki and Fischer, 2014). A number line appears to be
lacking entirely in participants who have not received any formal
school education (Núñez, 2011; Núñez et al., 2012), suggesting
that this line is more likely a product of the cultural habit of
measuring with rulers than the result of a preexisting neural
structure.
Cultural variability is amplified substantially when we turn
to the symbolic system, particularly with regard to how the
counting sequence itself is represented and structured, be it
by number words, written notations, body parts, or otherwise
external manners such as tallies or knotted strings. Each of these
representations comes with (culture-)specific properties, which
then affect how numerical information is cognitively represented
and processed. This has been described and analyzed extensively
for notational systems (Nickerson, 1988; Zhang and Norman,
1995; Chrisomalis, 2004; Schlimm and Neth, 2008; Widom and
Schlimm, 2012), but also for body-based systems (Domahs et al.,
2010; Beller and Bender, 2011; Bender and Beller, 2012) and even
verbal systems (e.g., Miura et al., 1993; Bender et al., 2015b).
The key argument is that the properties of such a cognitive
tool affect how it is used. The more regular a counting system
is, for instance, the easier it is to learn and handle (Fuson
and Kwon, 1991; Miura et al., 1993; Miller et al., 1995). The
more compact representations it affords (e.g., due to larger
counting units or smaller base size), the less cognitive load it will
generate during mental arithmetic (Bender et al., 2015b). And
when harnessing binary patterns, burdensome calculations can
be replaced by simple transformations (Bender and Beller, 2014a,
2016b). All these system properties, along with their cognitive
implications, vary substantially across languages and cultures,
thus generating considerable potential for diversity in numerical
cognition.
It should be stressed, however, that cognitive tools do not
dictate cognitive behavior. Even though they may provide the
foundation from which we reach further, we can steer the
development and change these tools if they turn out to be
insufficient (Beller and Bender, 2008), as attested to particularly
by the history of numerical notations. Diachronic analyses of
changes over time are thus an important addition to cross-
cultural comparisons (Haidle, 2014; Iliev and Ojalehto, 2015).
Explanatory Frameworks and Beliefs
The possibility that culture may affect cognition is perhaps
most easily acknowledged for those aspects of cognition that
are involved in people’s attempts to understand and explain
properties, relations, or events. It is arguably here where
culturally shaped beliefs most likely come to bear. How such
beliefs, and patterns of reasoning from them, may affect causal
attributions has been explored in a recent research topic (Beller
et al., 2014) and summarized elsewhere (Bender and Beller,
2016a). Here, we focus on the question of whether cultural
differences in expertise may affect explanatory depth, and discuss
the implications that culture-specific explanatory frameworks
may have for other domains of cognition, and the degree to which
diverging belief systems can co-exist.
The relevance of expertise for explanations and reasoning
has long been established, as has the fact that this expertise
may be a product of culturally shaped behavioral and cognitive
patterns (Medin and Atran, 2004; Atran and Medin, 2008).
This is observable at an early age and to the extent that it
shapes the course of cognitive development. But the impact
of culture goes beyond simply pre-structuring experiences and
hence expertise—it also conveys an interpretative framework
for what one experiences (e.g., Bang et al., 2007; Bang and
Medin, 2010; Ojalehto et al., 2013). Both of these effects
were observed in a study comparing Menominee children
from a Native American reservation and children from
both a rural and an urban Euro-American population. Only
the urban children displayed an anthropocentric perspective
(assumed to be fundamental in developmental psychology) that
prioritizes humans as the source for inferences, whereas the
two rural groups were guided by their expertise on the natural
environment. The two rural groups, on the other hand, differed
in the degree to which they considered the relation between
humans and non-human species as symmetric—a difference
grounded in their respective cultural background (Ross et al.,
2003).
More recently, the ramifications of such cultural
epistemologies were studied in greater depth in a series of
studies comparing US-Americans and Ngöbe from Panama
(Ojalehto et al., 2015; and see Ojalehto and Medin, 2015).
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These two groups differ in their epistemological orientation to
nature, which predisposes them to a distinct perspective on other
species and their interrelations. Compared to the US-Americans,
Ngöbe participants focus more on interconnectedness than
individualization, and acknowledge social agency in non-human
species to a greater extent. As a consequence, they are also
more likely to consider non-human species as being capable
of intentional communication and morality, and to interpret a
given ecological relationship as based on cooperation rather than
competition (Ojalehto et al., 2015).
Importantly, beliefs do not always, and not necessarily,
generate coherent belief systems, and a growing number of
studies are devoted to the conditions under which conflicting
beliefs can co-exist. Starting off with the classical anthropological
example of how Azande explain the collapse of a granary
alternatively by termite infestation and witchcraft (Evans-
Pritchard, 1937; and see Widlok, 2014), cognitive scientists
have taken up this issue by exploring how people reconcile
alternative beliefs for issues such as the origin of species, illness,
death, or acts of wrong-doing (Astuti et al., 2004; Legare and
Gelman, 2008; Hagmayer and Engelmann, 2014; Astuti and
Bloch, 2015; Moya et al., 2015; Watson-Jones et al., 2015).
The focus in these studies is directed toward “natural” vs.
“supernatural” explanations and toward the modes through
which such occasionally conflicting explanations are reconciled.
According to a recently proposed model (Legare et al., 2012),
the two types of explanations can be combined in one of
three manners, resulting in target-dependent thinking, synthetic
thinking, or a genuinely integrative account. Which of this is
strived for appears to depend not only on the context, but
more specifically on how this context is interpreted in cultural
terms. Interestingly, the likelihood of adopting a supernatural
explanation appears to be greater among adults than among
children (Astuti and Harris, 2008), suggesting that natural
explanations are prevailing early on and are increasingly modified
by cultural input.
IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE
DIVERSITY
The studies reviewed in the previous section clearly attest to
cognitive diversity not just in the content of cognition, or beliefs
more specifically, but on various levels. Processes as basic as
perception appear to be modified by the environment in which
we grow up, by the language we speak, and by the cultural
patterns directing our attention. Cultural tools and practices
such as counting sequences and measuring with rulers affect
how numerical intuitions are cognitively represented, whether
we are able to precisely assess larger quantities, and which
difficulties we encounter during mental arithmetic. And on the
most explicit level, our cultural background provides us with a
set of beliefs, a range of activities that entail diverging degrees
of expertise, and interpretative frameworks for the experience
we gain in the interaction with our environment and our
cohabiters, human and non-human. Far from being superficial
differences in ‘just’ the content of cognition, the latter may
affect processes as fundamental as categorization, reasoning, and
cognitive maturation. Still, the effects on these levels differ in the
way in which they unfold.
To begin in reversed order, explanatory frameworks certainly
constitute the most direct and straightforward way in which
culture exerts its influence. The lion’s share of beliefs we come
to hold throughout our lives is picked up as part of our
cultural tradition, through explicit teaching or from observing
the patterns of behavior in our social environment. Necessarily,
some of these beliefs will conflict with each other, but we
learn to integrate them, or at least allow them to co-exist, in
line with heuristics that we also learn as part of our cultural
background. The degree of cultural variability in this respect
might therefore seem unsurprising, and yet it goes beyond
what we have explicitly learned in that it also encompasses the
inferences drawn from it.
As demonstrated for numerical cognition, cognitive
processing is also affected by the cultural tools that were
designed for certain purposes and that happen to have properties
which set constraints, but also generate affordances, thus
inevitably affecting the cognitive processes involved in the task
at hand. It is thus not by accident that over the last decades, the
domain of numerical cognition has contributed substantially
to innovative paradigms in cognitive science—including the
idea that cognition can be embodied (e.g., Fischer and Brugger,
2011), distributed (Hutchins, 1995; Zhang and Norman, 1995),
and extend our mind (De Cruz, 2008)—and has served as
an emblematic example of cultural bootstrapping (Miller and
Paredes, 1996). Yet, current models of numerical cognition are
based on studies with people using a distinct decimal system
accompanied by written notation, and are therefore not (yet)
able to account for differences that may emerge from such
system-specific properties and/or a lack of written notation more
generally.
On the basic level of perception and categorization, finally, the
influence exerted by culture remains rather subtle, but may be
pervasive nonetheless. Here, our cognitive processor is trained
by the constant confrontation with information input—either
directly from an environment shaped by cultural activities, or
indirectly through the spectacles of a linguistic taxonomy. While
the latter has been subject to intense research and continuous
debate (reviewed in Enfield, 2015), the former has been largely
neglected, which is why even the hypotheses on how exactly
culture affects perception have remained speculative.
The most important insight from the findings summarized
here is that diversity provides highly valuable information, not
only in its own right, but also for theoretical advances in
cognitive science as it allows one to correct or refine existing
models and to reconstruct the emergence and evolution of
cognitive phenomena, together with their possible changes over
time (Levinson, 2012; Levinson and Gray, 2012). Cognitive
processes are tailored to a specific format of representation,
which in turn facilitates some processes while hampering others.
Scrutinizing these processes irrespective of content or context—
which, because they may vary, are conceived of as blurring
those findings cognitive science actually strives for—only blurs
the insights we obtain (Bender et al., 2015a). Our prospect
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of approaching a comprehensive understanding of cognition
therefore depends crucially on our willingness to take content and
cultural variation into account.
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